THE HUMANITIES STRIKE BACK:
(E)ESG AND JUSTICE STRINE CHALLENGE
GAMER SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY
David H. Webber*
Imagine if we stopped deciding basketball games by baskets alone.
Instead, victory would be determined by a combination of baskets, rebounds,
steals, and fouls. Each of these is universally acknowledged as a critical
component of the game. Why not reward them directly instead of indirectly,
by their connection to baskets alone? Don’t we track steals and award
rebounding titles? As to fouls, we use foul shots to convert their value into
the only outcome of interest. But don’t fouls also have an ethical dimension,
one concealed by basket-scoring primacy? And speaking of ethics, should
scoring be limited to on-court behavior? For example, in the recent Netflix
documentary, The Last Dance, about Michael Jordan’s final championship
year with the Chicago Bulls, the Detroit Pistons served as a convenient foil
to the Second City’s heroic team. Detroit’s “Bad Boys” played dirty, fouled
frequently, and famously walked off the court before the end of the game,
and without shaking hands, after losing to the Bulls in the 1991 Eastern
Conference Finals. 1 Why let teams like that even get so far? Why not
directly factor their behavior into the score, forcing the team to internalize
the full cost of its conduct?
The response to my hypothetical basketball reform is straightforward.
Even if these alternative metrics have some merit, even if scoring all would
provide a richer picture of what occurred on (and off) the court, their
inclusion would destroy the game. Almost any single, simple metric would
be preferable to more than one. Multiple metrics would undermine
consensus about who won, and even a combined weighted metric might
trigger endless debates not about the outcome but about the weights. The
latter would let fans leave the arena or shut off their televisions either unsure
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of who won or agreeing to disagree about who did. No more last-second
buzzer beaters, no more highs and lows of decisive victory, just endless
disputes. Playoffs would become debate tournaments, a prospect that
appeals to no one except lawyers. There could never be an undisputed
scoring champion like a Michael Jordan, or at least not one without an
asterisk, “*baskets only.” 2 The joy of the game is increased, its energy
concentrated and intensified by its ability to produce these winners and
losers, to create an absolute and universally agreed hierarchy—league
tables—to do so within fixed timeframes—quarters—that have a clear
beginning and end, enabling victors to be declared and the season to restart,
a fresh chance for losers to become winners and vice versa. To give up all
that, even in exchange for greater fairness or accuracy, would not be worth
the sacrifice.
Leo E. Strine, Jr. is closing in on Blair and Stout for the undisputed title
of all-time top-scoring stakeholderist. 3 I don’t intend to squander this
opportunity to roast and toast him by weighing the pros and cons of basketscoring primacy. Instead, my aim is to surface an overlooked argument in
the debate over shareholder primacy and stakeholderism, the case for which
has been recently reinvigorated by Strine’s work. My argument is this: one
underappreciated aspect of shareholder primacy’s appeal is that it creates a
competition with a single endpoint, basically a game, and that the
exhilarating tournament that results, separate and apart from any ethical or
instrumental justification, is an underestimated aspect of shareholder
primacy’s appeal. I want to be clear that this is not intended as any glib insult
hurled at the doctrine. Quite the contrary, its advocates root their claims in
wholly legitimate philosophical foundations, in libertarian ideas about
freedom and private property, in notions of the common good best advanced
2. This requires no citation, but just in case: NBC Sports Bay Area Staff, Steph Curry
Joins Exclusive List of Scoring Champions, NBC SPORTS (May 16, 2021),
https://www.nbcsports.com/bayarea/warriors/steph-curry-joins-exclusive-list-scoringchamp-legends [https://perma.cc/7XE8-MMYC] (“The GOAT [Michael Jordan] led the
league in scoring 10 times, a record that will not be broken for a long time, if ever . . . . If
making a list of the NBA’s all-time scoring king based on points per game, Jordan would be
at the very top with a career average of 30.12 PPG.”).
3. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,
85 U. VA. L. REV. 247 (1999) (often cited as among the most prominent articulations of
stakeholderism). Stout also noted the advantage of shareholder primacy’s explanatory
simplicity, though I argue here that its simplicity also creates a better, more appealing game.
See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, The Problem of Corporate Purpose, ISSUES IN GOVERNANCE
STUDIES, June 2012, at 3, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06
/Stout_Corporate-Issues.pdf [https://perma.cc/XP2Y-3DHR] (“To the popular press and the
business media, shareholder primacy provided an easy sound-bite explanation of the
firm . . . .”).
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by each person pursuing his or her own lawful self-interest, in empirical
claims about what best stimulates economic growth, in pragmatic claims that
stakeholder interests are best addressed by governments, not corporations.4
I disagree with some of these claims, but accept the good faith nature of the
arguments made in their favor.
Still, I think it remains the case that shareholder primacy creates a better
game than stakeholderism, and that this preference explains some of the
doctrine’s attractiveness, and even some of its overlooked explanatory
power. I recognize that there can be something trivializing about this
argument, even if it’s true. In an era afflicted by existential crises like global
warming, economic inequality, and racial inequity, the idea of defending (or
attacking) shareholder primacy on the grounds that it creates a more exciting
game sounds disrespectful coming from a critic, or shameful from an
advocate. Aesthetic arguments seem misplaced and trivial relative to the
future of the planet. It’s like discussing the gamelike aspects of war, though
I believe that anyone who fails to acknowledge such aspects is missing an
important explanatory variable.
There is also an element to the debate between shareholder primacy and
stakeholderism that’s analogous to the contest between STEM and the
humanities, pitting the scientist or engineer against the philosopher or
English major. It reminds me of the familiar complaint about the MBAs who
took over the publishing industry. From one perspective, they ruined it by
applying market metrics to the unquantifiable question of what makes a good
novel. From another perspective, they used objective metrics to reduce
agency costs by eliminating the three-hour martini lunch and the publication
of a bunch of dull highbrow writing no one actually wanted to read.
Conversely, something about stakeholderism smacks of the philosopher or
English major’s revenge on the technocrat and the MBA, sullying the purity
and elegance of math by dragging us back down into the eternal irresolvable
muck of competing narratives and contested values, the muck of politics, the
muck of making unfalsifiable claims. Both sides think their own worldview
is more appealing and more real.
4. See Judd F. Sneirson, The History of Shareholder Primacy, from Adam Smith
Through the Rise of Financialism, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY (Beate Sjåfjell & Christopher M. Bruner eds.,
2019) (discussing the development of shareholder primacy, including, for example, the
property comparisons made by Berle and Means and the law and economics argument that
shareholder primacy is rooted in economic efficiency); see also Lucian A. Bebchuk and
Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance, 106 CORNELL L. REV.
91, 170–71 (2020) (“However, given our conclusion that stakeholderism should not be
expected to deliver the hoped-for stakeholder protections, external adoption of laws, rules and
policies remains the main avenue through which real protections could be achieved.”).
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Starting within academia, consider the way that shareholder primacy
has enthroned regression analysis in corporate law. The most underexamined relationship in corporate law academia is the strong correlation
between professors who love shareholder primacy and professors who love
regression analysis. I hypothesize a coefficient approaching one. In a
regression, there is one outcome of interest, the dependent variable. There
are an infinite variety of possible inputs, independent variables. Shareholder
primacy tells us what the singular dependent variable is: share price, or
maybe Tobin’s Q. 5 Properly trained academics can then deploy their skills
to explore the infinite possibilities of what creates or destroys shareholder
value. It’s no exaggeration to suggest that the dominant strain of corporate
law and finance in recent decades has been the hunt for statistically
significant independent variables that positively or negatively correlate with
share price. How many papers have been published, PhDs granted, tenured
positions conferred for papers fitting this mold?
Since the publication of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick in 2003, this effort
has zeroed in on what governance or legal factors maximize share price.6
Virtually no aspect of law and corporate governance has been left
unexamined. We now have more than twenty years chasing high R-squareds
and previously unappreciated (or overappreciated) independent variables. 7
How much consensus this research has actually generated about optimal
legal or governance arrangements is an open question, even within an
exclusively shareholder primacy framework. But no one can dispute it has
prompted a profitable gold rush for data and the academics who can analyze
it. 8

5. See RICHARD A. BOOTH, FINANCING THE CORPORATION § 2:30 (2020–2021 ed. 2020)
(“Tobin’s Q . . . is the ratio of market value to book value. As originally formulated, the ratio
was based on the notion that market price should exceed replacement costs if assets are
generally devoted to their highest and best use (as they should be). Thus, Tobin’s Q should
ordinarily be greater than one.”); see also Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate
Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 639 (2006) (noting that empirical
scholars often formulate shareholder primacy by incorporating measures of shareholder value
like stock price and Tobin’s Q into calculations).
6. Paul A. Gompers, Joy L. Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity
Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107 (2003).
7. See Joanna M. Shepherd et al., What Else Matters for Corporate Governance?: The
Case of Bank Monitoring, 88 B.U. L. REV. 991, 998–1000 (2008) (offering an overview of
the empirical corporate governance literature legal and finance scholars have authored;
examples of variables corporate scholars have studied to try to track the impact of corporate
governance on firm value include staggered boards, golden parachutes, various takeover
defenses, and provisions on shareholder voting, to name a few).
8. An April 15, 2022 Google search of “corporate governance” and “sample” and
“coefficient” yielded 141,000 results.
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Shareholder primacy pulls corporate law away from the humanities and
towards STEM. It transforms the academic study of corporate law from what
to how. It turns corporate law into a regression. We know what the goal is,
the hard part is how to reach it. It makes corporate law a more technical and
mathematical field, with falsifiable claims and problems that can be solved
by access to and analysis of data, a field resembling technology or
engineering, in which we can strive to tell not just what’s different, but
what’s better. Within this framework, intellectual attainment in the field
begins to feel like technological advance. With a single output of interest,
we set ourselves up to make measurable progress, even if that progress
remains contested. It’s as if, with additional research, more data, better
computing power, more advanced techniques, one decade from now we
should be able to implement evidence-based governance structures more
capable of maximizing returns than the ones we have now. A new and
improved product, like the latest iPhone. We can aim to create the right
compensation structure, capital structure, legal structure, or at least we can
create a menu of evidence-based options from which different companies
might choose depending upon a relatively narrow set of preferences, again
with the singular goal in mind. (And what we do to data in the name of this
progress makes us sound like nineteenth century industrialists: we exploit
it, we mine it, we scrape it).
This is a heady project, facilitated by single endpoint corporate law, and
it is understandable that those who thrive in it might be skeptical of claims
that would undermine it.
Outside academia, in corporate boardrooms and on Wall Street,
shareholder primacy also creates a game in which everyone knows what the
goal is. Just like sports. The singular goal of basket scoring gives meaning
to every aspect of the game, such that every action, counteraction, or inaction
has consequences. Ditto for the corporation operating under shareholder
primacy. Every single action either advances or undermines the goal, and
can be assessed accordingly. It creates winning and losing strategies,
winning and losing people, indisputable hierarchy. The same is true for
investors. If we don’t factor in questions like environmental or jobs impact,
then we have a straightforward way of knowing who had the best year or
decade as an investor. We can rank everyone by performance, CEOs,
companies, equity analysts, underwriters. We have league tables, quarters,
comparables. We know pretty clearly who was underpaid and who was
overpaid and why. Team strategy itself can be reduced to a small set of
variations. We can hire accordingly. In this world, the rules of the game are
clear and the empiricist reigns, in both industry and academia.
The connection between a single endpoint game like shareholder
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primacy and sports is everywhere to be seen, and deeply embedded in the
current culture. Think of a writer like Michael Lewis publishing The Big
Short and Moneyball. 9 The Big Short was about geeky, numbers-driven Wall
Street traders who made a fortune betting against the market consensus on
home prices. Moneyball—the title itself is revealing—was about a geeky
numbers-driven baseball manager who bet against the consensus on baseball
talent and whose method eventually led to the Boston Red Sox to win the
World Series for the first time in eighty-six years. Same author, same
audience, same interests, same game, same story. The heroes of The Big
Short and Moneyball are interchangeable and could have easily swapped
careers. It would be unsporting to point out that the heroes of The Big Short
made their money on the eventual collapse of the housing market that wiped
out enormous household wealth. Shareholder primacy tells us what parts of
the story matter, and do not matter. These investors were just doing their
job. We know what to not pay attention to, to not write about, to maintain
the good story. Think also of Elon Musk’s October 2021 tweet at Jeff Bezos
containing nothing but a silver medal. 10 The Bloomberg Billionaires Index
had just reported that Musk’s combined Tesla and SpaceX stakes surpassed
Bezos’s Amazon stake. 11 If we were instead thinking about workers or
environmental impact, neither of these guys would be on the podium. There
would be multiple podiums, or none at all.
The production and reproduction of hierarchy created by any closeduniverse, single-endpoint game has inherent appeal separate and apart from
theoretical or empirical justifications. Part of it is surely entertainment value.
Look at Cramer’s Mad Money or the twenty-four-hour business news
channels. But that’s not all I mean. Clear hierarchy provides a sense of order
and place, a sense of quantifiable impact, a sense of certainty. Some people
choose careers in corporate law over constitutional law, in markets over other
fields, precisely because of this quality. At least part of my own attraction
to corporate law was the sense that its impact was more measurable than,
say, constitutional law, and, therefore, one wasn’t always left with the
sneaking suspicion that everything you were talking about might be
9. MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2011); MICHAEL
LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME (2004).
10. Grace Kay, Elon Musk Pokes Fun at Jeff Bezos with a Silver-Medal Emoji as the Gap
Between the Wealthiest Men in the World Widens, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 11, 2021, 11:29 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/elon-musk-tweets-silver-medal-emoji-jeff-bezos-2021-10
[https://perma.cc/HZ2N-LCAK].
11. Tim Levin, Elon Musk Is Once Again the World’s Richest Person as Tesla’s Upward
Tear Continues, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 16, 2021, 12:29 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com
/elon-musk-jeff-bezos-net-worth-worlds-richest-tesla-amazon-stock-2021-1
[https://perma.cc/M7CK-3CE4].
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inconsequential. Likewise, not everyone goes to Wall Street for the money
alone, but also for the game it creates, and for the sense of certainty that
comes with measuring the impact of one’s thoughts and actions, even when
that impact may be negative. At least it feels consequential, at least you can
think precisely about how to change the outcome, in contrast to so many
fields that we might think of as being more in the realm of liberal arts, in
which it is very often difficult to prove or know anything with much
certainty. Undermining this quality undermines what drew many people to
the field in the first place.
Stakeholderism threatens to ruin this game in much the same way that
the basketball reformer ruins basketball. It doesn’t negate it entirely, but it
opens the door to debates over the merits not unlike the debates of whether
the higher-rebounding team was better than the one that scored more baskets.
Even the mere fact of these debates is a loss from the perspective of the single
endpoint advocate, as it detracts from and devalues the how questions in
favor of a return to what. Five years ago, if some governance arrangement
was revealed to maximize share price or Tobin’s Q, that would have looked
like an unalloyed win. But in a stakeholderist world, such a finding is
diminished if we know nothing about what it does to workers, to the
company’s propensity to pollute, to the hiring pool. Asking about these at a
faculty workshop would have invited a sneer. Asking about it at a pension
trustees meeting would have triggered a legal warning about breaching one’s
fiduciary duty. People who want to exclude these concerns from the
corporate conversation do so because they believe corporate law isn’t the
place for it. No doubt because of traditional reasons for defending
shareholder primacy, reducing agency costs, stopping executives from
playing politics with other people’s money. But the fact that it undermines
the game is at least part of the reason why. Their objection is like the
objection all might have if a star basketball team visited an ailing city and
decided to throw the game to give the fans something to cheer.
Similarly, the CEO or investor who makes huge profits for shareholders
was once almost completely immunized from the consequences of even quite
appalling personal misconduct on account of extraordinary performance, not
unlike athletes. Much in the way that many sports fans would be quite happy
to see an athlete’s personal misconduct punished by almost anything other
than in-game punishment, so the idea of firing a top performer for personal
misconduct was once unthinkable. From the perspective of maintaining the
integrity of the single endpoint game, many do not want an all-star left off
the court for off-court behavior, they do not want in-game punishment for
out-of-game behavior. Almost any departure from the single endpoint opens
the door to an unraveling of the consensus that propels the game itself.
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That leads me to Leo Strine’s Restoration: The Role Stakeholder
Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American
Economy. This paper is about as elegant and devastating a critique of
shareholder primacy as we will get in this generation. A couple of aspects
of it were particularly noteworthy. His dissection of what he calls the “moral
balm” of residual claimant theory is particularly memorable for both
substantive and stylistic reasons, as usual. 12 Looking past formal options of
who is the residual claimant in bankruptcy, he points out that stockholders
“take all the time,” in dividends, buybacks, M&A and activist events, and
that diversified investors are better protected than virtually all other
stakeholders from firm-specific risk. 13 He refers to the “blinkered” way
academics study corporate law, and the academy’s lateness to the social,
economic, and political problems wrought by shareholder primacy. 14 He
rebukes that study, suggesting that it is time to “better align our corporate
governance system with the interests of humanity in ensuring that in trying
to build wealth, we do not destroy the planet, injure consumers, or otherwise
cause more harm than good.” 15 He bemoans the baleful influence of the
academy, referring to “just how influential academic framing can be in
skewing not only academic thought itself, but public policy.” 16 And he
attacks shareholder primacy as a “narrow measure [that] has no compelling
relationship to the overall value that a corporation provides to society.” 17 He
spells it out in making the following point:
A company that provides a 6 percent return to equity, but that
employs 10,000 workers at fair wages and in safe conditions in all
its global operations, uses only contractors who do the same, and
creates no externalities may well provide more value to society
than an industry competitor that provides a 9 percent return to
equity, but employs far fewer workers directly and at much lower
wages, that relies on even lower paid contracted labor, takes few
safety protections, and generates externalities such as consumer
and environmental harm. 18
Why has this point been ignored for so long? Strine doesn’t offer
explanations here, but I think it is at least in part because of the reasons
12. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in
Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy: A Reply to Professor Rock, 76 BUS.
LAW. 397, 408 (2021).
13. Id. at 409.
14. Id. at 412.
15. Id. at 401.
16. Id. at 406 (emphasis added).
17. Id. at 410.
18. Id.
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outlined above. Because if we open the door to standards like Strine’s to
“provide more value to society”—and I believe we must open that door—we
also open it to debate over which values and why, and that’s a big change to
the game as it has been played for the last few decades.
I largely align myself with Strine’s side of the argument. I applaud his
coining of the term “EESG” 19 to prioritize employees who, as Strine himself
has put it, “are always getting stuck in the S.” Still, there is something
disheartening about trying to nudge corporate law discourse out of its
specialized, narrow corner and into the larger political conversation, because
that broader political conversation feels so toxic and pointless right now. But
I don’t think we have a choice. In my view, the market is the unmoved mover
of our day, it is the most powerful human institution, and if it doesn’t deal in
some direct way with the world’s greatest challenges, then they won’t get
dealt with at all. Stakeholderism enables the corporate sector to deal with
these pressing problems, not exclusively, but working with society more
broadly, in ways that, in Strine’s words, “better align our corporate
governance system with the interests of humanity.” 20

19. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism 6 (Roosevelt Inst.,
Working Paper No. 202008, 2020), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads//08/RI_
TowardFairandSustainableCapitalism_WorkingPaper_202008.pdf [https://perma.cc/69BLP6MD] (coining term EESG).
20. Id. at 401.

